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The paper aims at developing some ground principles around the idea of a possible 
governance of Responsible Innovation in the organizations. In particular the paper works 
around a standard named UGO (in opposition to the usual name of management system that 
are almost alphanumeric string) developed by CISE (Center for innovation and Economical 
Development) whose goal is to help every kind of organization in projecting, developing and 
managing any innovation that was targeted to the improvement of quality of life of people 
that will use that innovation.  
The paper consist of two parts: the first one about the consequence of the application 
of an ethic to the concept of innovation, that suggest the need to temper the concept of limit 
(imposed by an ethic, whatever, and the consequent responsibility that stems from) and the 
idea of innovation (limitless by nature); the second about the governance of innovation that, 
assuming as true the Dilemma of Collingridge ,focuses mainly for the need of a governance 
system that, mixing static elements (the usual requirements of a management system) and 
dynamic ones (the continuous relationship with the stakeholders), and considering the 
precautionary principle, could lead to control the critic step between the basic research and 
the effective production of an innovation, where an effective responsible governance could 
be applied. 
 
Key words: Responsible Innovation, ethics of Innovation, Governance of Innovation, UGO 
Standard, Precautionary Principle 
1. Why does innovation has to be responsible? The origin of the approach 
In the last decades many responsibilities have been assigned to the word 
"innovation". First of all, it has been appointed responsible to find a new path which 
would help humanity to overcome the serious crisis affecting contemporary world 
economy, through the creation of new products, services and even markets. 
Secondly, it has been assigned the responsibility to re- innovate (innovate again) our 
society and institutions, to make our life-style more sustainable, efficient and right. 
Finally, the innovations originated by the scientific and technological research are 
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expected to offer us a better and longer life. Thus, innovation is considered as 
primarily responsible of our future. 
From an exclusively economic point of view, the debate is focused on the role 
that innovation could play in increasing enterprises' competitiveness. In fact, it is 
clear that businesses operating in extremely "competitive" contexts, such as markets, 
assign primary relevance to competitiveness, as well as it is natural for them to 
perceive the ability to make innovations as an element qualifying and improving bu-
sinesses' performances. 
However, today, non-economic factors seem to ever more influence purchase 
choices of enterprises, institutions and customers. New findings resulting from a Ni-
elsen Report (2012) survey of 28,000 consumers from 56 countries around the 
world, clearly revealed, for example, that the 46% of respondents, regardless to 
contemporary international crisis, said to be willing to buy products and services 
from companies which have implemented programs intended to give back (in 
different ways) part of the produced income to society. 
Also Amartya Sen's work, who received the Nobel Prize in Economic 
Sciences, focuses on this very topic: he clearly proves that economic development 
does not simply leads to the increase of disposable income, but in fact it is every day 
more often associated to the idea of people's better quality of life.2 The ability to 
perceive these expectations, in addition to its primary ethical and social significance, 
plays an important role also from a mere economic perspective.3 However, apart 
from the expectations for this field, at least at a national level, no attention is being 
paid to the kind of innovation necessary to build a better future. 
The UGO Standard, developed by CISE4, have been created in the belief that 
innovations, able to allow the realization of such a goal, have to be "responsible", in 
other words, they have to be able to improve the quality of life of their users, as well 
as to give competitive advantage to the enterprises which produced them, complying 
                                                     
 
2 See his latest publication, Sen (2010).  
3 Other recent research have clearly demonstrated that responsibility applied to business, rather than a 
do-gooding intuition, is more similar to an event able to impact real economy. For example, in two arti-
cles published in the “Working Papers” series, edited by the Harvard Business School, Eccles et al. 
(2011) unquestionably confirmed two aspects of the phenomenon, so far doubted. In the former article 
they proved that a positive relation actually exists, for example, between enterprises which adopt re-
sponsible management practices and the possibility to obtain credits from banks: out of the confront of 
thes e enterprises with a large group of businesses, conducted over a long period of time (16 years), it 
has emerged that the former could easier obtain credits or larger amount of money than the other ones.. 
In the second onme, referring to the findings of a sample survey conducted on 180 enterprises which 
adopted responsible and sustainable behaviours, they explained that these enterprises had better per-
formances that their competitors, keeping them unchanged over time, especially in those sectors where 
there is a direct connection between producers and consumers (Ioannou–Serafeim 2011). 
4 CISE is the Special Agency of the Chamber of Commerce of Forlì-Cesena (Italy). 
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with some ethical obligations. Boundless and undefined innovations, in fact, do not 
represent the most appropriate subject to contribute to the progress of our society 
At this point, it is necessary to better specify what does an ethics for 
innovation means and which goal it has to be aimed at, in order to be considered 
responsible, at least according to the UGO Standard, even if, from an economic 
point of view, this is not enough. The UGO Standard addresses, first of all, those 
organizations5 producing those innovations which enter citizen's life. In their 
opinion to innovate means giving new or more efficient answers to meet market's 
needs. This practice can be described recurring to concepts such as risk, promptness 
and competitiveness, concepts significantly influencing corporate policies. This is 
the reason why we need an active governance of innovation, able to manage the 
process in a clear, inclusive and dynamic way, in order to satisfy society's 
expectations for innovation. This would need an instrument of government allowing 
enterprises to acquire or maintain over time a success depending on long-lasting 
factors, which, at the same time, could generate (and/or recreate) people's trust in the 
economic system. More details on the topic will be presented in the following pages. 
"Responsible innovation" is a concept involving several knowledges and 
imposes an approach which, starting from the realization of new ideas and 
then proceeding with the consideration of their impacts, will allow us to design the 
future the entire society is dreaming of and make our life reaching that quality we 
have always desired. 
However, it presents several difficulties because of the need to promptly face 
problems, requiring rapid solutions and preventing us from appropriately reflecting 
even on fundamental questions for our society; in this case, I think, nothing can 
better explain this situation than the starting lines of one of the most beautiful 
children's stories: «Here is Edward Bear, coming downstairs now, bump, bump, 
bump, on the back of his head, behind Christopher Robin. It is, as far as he knows, 
the only way of coming downstairs, but sometimes he feels that there really is 
another way, if only he could stop bumping for a moment and think of it» (Milne 
1994, p. 1).6 
                                                     
 
5 Here the word "organization" is used in its etymological acceptation of "group of people linked by 
connections established with the aim to reach one or more common goals that separately they would 
not have been able to reach". For this reason, public administration as well, may be included in this def-
inition, with no intention to reduce the difference existing between institutions, legislative organisms, 
appointed to issue rules intended to guarantee a peaceful coexistence, and civil society's economic or-
ganizations, operating in compliance with the rules established by institutions. 
6 Quoted from Milne, A. A. (1994): The complete tales of Winnie-the-Pooh. 
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2. Ethics of innovation 
Putting the modifier "responsible" before the noun "innovation" means adding an 
ethical meaning to the innovation process. Innovation in itself represents a morally 
neutral act7; in fact, its ethical dimension depends on the reasons determing its future 
implementations. Although, philosophy literature does not univocally accept this 
position. According to Natali C. (1999): Aristotele: Nicomachean Ethics (1135a 15-
1135b 11), for example, no action can be completely neutral from a moral point of 
view, as any action expressing an act of will would appear as morally connoted, be-
ing it the actualization of a will and of its goals. It is clear that, if considered from 
this perspective, the moral evaluation would appear as inseparable form any human 
action, suggesting that no mortally neutral activity could ever exist. However, in 
order to evaluate acts or actions from a moral perspective (if not totally 
acknowledging ethical relativism), it would be necessary to refer to a principle 
allowing consistent evaluations in similar Conditions.8 Moreover, even in case there 
would not be any reference (Hare 1968), we could affirm that any act, from a 
knowledge, first, and then moral point of view, would remain neutral. An example 
of what stated above is contained in the following Kantian aphorism (Kant 1970 
[1785], p. 91): «Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the 
same time as an end». This is a moral rule applicable to each man and in each 
situation, which is not influenced by anything, neither a prize, for example, nor 
negatively by a feeling for a behaviour that does not correspond to what indicated in 
the principle.9 
Then, defying innovation as "responsible" means identifying the principle 
referring to which it could be defined as a "positive" (effective) one. Nevertheless, 
the discover of an innovative field theoretically creates the conditions for the 
production of ethically acceptable applications, as well as of absolutely aberrant 
ones. 
                                                     
 
7 The words "ethics" and "morality" significantly overlap as both define the same semantic area, though 
the former has a Greek origin while the latter has a Latin one. Thus, in this text we will use them as 
synonyms. Nevertheless, from a closer analysis, a difference between the two terms exists, if consider-
ing morality a body of social norms defining the behaviour to adopt and ethics (seen as a branch of phi-
losophy) as the discipline which studies the structures of this very body. 
8 The identification of those situations, where the moral principle could be appropriately applied, or of 
that hierarchy, according to which one has to apply principles and pursue regulations in each situation, 
represents the core of any moral theory which describes the human behaviour. Hauser's research (2007) 
on the genetic origin of the moral behaviour at the basis of social coexistence has proved that, even if 
men are able to instinctively adopt morally-oriented behaviours, the contingent situations in which they 
make such evaluations significantly influence their choices. Thus, judging these situations from a moral 
perspective seems to acquire a cultural significance. 
9 Kant 2001 [1787], § 4, p. 16. 
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As for responsibility, it is a concept belonging to the semantic domain of any 
definition trying to construct or refer to (one or more) ethics.10 
From an historical point of view, the concept of responsibility appears for the 
first time in philosophic and legal literature at the end of the XVIII century. As for 
philosophy, the English Empiricists11 were the first who used it to demonstrate the 
impossibility to associate the concepts of "absolute need" and "absolute freedom" to 
any form of moral judgement12; in fact, responsibility limits absolute freedom's 
fields of action, confining it within the borders imposed by the prediction and the 
following identification among one's own behaviours of possible unacceptable 
effects, determined by a specific action. Thus, partially limiting the exercise of an 
absolute freedom in the development of any kind of innovation, represents the 
funding limit and opportunity at the basis of the UGO Standard; it establishes that 
any innovation, in order to be considered as ethically correct (as above described), 
has to aim at «increasing human beings' quality of life».13 We have to underline that 
here the word commitment has a positive acceptation, as suggested by Douglas 
Hofsdadter: it is considered as an element able to create opportunities, as 
commitments make people taking the most advantage they can from their own 
creativity, to the point to increase their chances to make innovation.14 Improving 
                                                     
 
10 There are, in fact, come scholars, such as Jonas H. (1990) or Weber M. (1970 [1934]), who seem to 
be trying to create a kind of special Ethics, the Ethics of responsibility, in the attempt to prove that Eth-
ics has a specific domain associated to responsibility, a domain characterized by unique features. As 
long as responsibility derives from the Latin word respondere and, from a philosophical point of view, 
being responsible could be interpreted as promising to answer, to somebody or to oneself, for one's own 
actions as well as for the consequences deriving from them, thus it is not clear why an Ethics, based on 
rational (in a wide acceptation) prerequisites, even if deontological, could not be responsible. Neverthe-
less, Jonas has been the one who affirmed the need to pay, in contemporary age, extreme attention (that 
is responsibility) to the implications that scientific and technological development could have on the 
future, though distant from now, which turns, then, into an horizon to consider during the exercise of 
responsibility, even if unknown. 
11 See for example Hume (2008 [1740]). Particularly interesting is the Book III, which contains the 
formulation of Hume's law on the impossibility to logically derive moral principles from the mere de-
scriptions of facts. «In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always re-
marked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the 
being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surprised 
to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition 
that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of 
the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is 
necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given; 
for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which 
are entirely different from it» (ivi, pp. 496-497). 
12 For more details on the philosophical meaning of the concept of responsibility see Abbagnano–
Fornero (2005). 
13 UGO Certification Standard, version 1.1 2012: Definitions. 
14 As for the concept of commitment and the creative potentiality that commitment, in an apparently 
counterintuitive way, see in particular Hofstadter (1987, 1996). The relation between creativity and the 
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human beings' quality of life represents, then, the UGO Standard's corner stone and 
its final aim as well, also from a logical point of view. Considering the quality of life 
as the core element of the Standard's logical construction could lead to its possible 
inclusion in the group of the so-called "common goods". Obviously, here we do not 
refer to natural common goods (forests, atmosphere, water and so on), but to cultural 
and social goods and/or to those allowing our society to function. In fact, if we adopt 
the classic acceptation of “common goods” «which all enjoy in common in the sense 
that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any 
other individual's consumption of that good» (Samuelson 1954, p. 387), the concept 
of "quality of life”, as defined in the UGO Standard, seems to perfectly match this 
definition. The Standard, in fact, defines “quality of life” as «that dimension of 
existence that, in the constant and dynamic intertwining of relationships, finds the 
conditions necessary to guarantee free spaces to individuals and community, in 
compliance with ethical obligations, those guiding obligations that – originated from 
a rational agreement existing between social actors – aims at distinguishing good 
from bad, the acceptable from the unacceptable».15 
Notwithstanding the different theories regarding the nature and usability of 
common goods, there is the possibility and, according to us, the probability that the 
concept of quality of life belongs to the domain of common goods (see for example 
Ostrom 2006). Regardless to the acceptation given to them, common goods present, 
from a theoretical perspective, some unique features: they are inclusive and 
commonly owned and their preservation is a priority for society. In other words, the 
quantity of common goods should have to be increased, if possible, or, at least, keep 
unchanged and possibly never be reduced.16 This statement, apparently irrational 
from a strictly economic point of view, is explained by the fact that the decision to 
reduce the general value of common goods because of economic choices, taken in 
the name of an alleged rapid profit, would cause to the present and future society 
collective and probably immeasurable costs of social, environmental and economic 
nature. An example of the above, is represented by air pollution and the resulting 
health damages which occurrence leads to some obligations imposed to society, 
mainly at the expenses of the national health service, then to community itself; a 
second example consists in the limited access to water for basic needs, as proved by 
the famous "Water War" which have recently taken place in Bolivia, causing 
                                                                                                         
 
creation of innovation, terms identifying different phenomena, clearly reveals even if not mechanisti-
cally determined. This explains why extending the meaning of commitment beyond the moral dimen-
sion of taking on responsibility, the meaning it assumes in this context, it seems to be also relevant with 
regard to innovation. 
15 UGO Certification Standard, version 1.1 2012: Definitions. 
16 The UGO Standard, in fact, introduces responsible innovation as an element able to improve the 
quality of life. 
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substantial costs at the expenses of community, involved enterprises and 
institutions.17 
Therefore, it is economically reasonable, besides morally appropriate, to 
preserve the total quantity and quality of the available common goods in the medium 
and long run. 
Citizens, in fact, are now able to clearly distinguish opportunistic behaviours, 
which endanger common goods, and have started to support ever more often those 
subjects, who pay attention to those very elements. Then, it will be particularly 
unwise for enterprises not to include the latter in their corporate policies and 
strategies. 
The foregoing statements are also true as for life quality, which could serve as 
a synthetic concept able to express the quantity of available and accessible common 
goods in a specific context.18 
Analysing the definition of "quality of life" presented in the UGO Standard, 
we can highlight four ethically relevant points: 
1. the need to refer to a rational agreement; 
2. the identification of a demarcation principle; 
3. the assumption of a dynamic and evolutionary perspective; 
4. a long-lasting and effective relation with stakeholders to be established by 
innovating enterprises. 
 
The first point suggests that adopting inclusive approaches, resulting from a 
rational agreement19 among the subjects asked to construct and define the 
innovation, is the essential prerequisite to a responsible innovation. The concept of 
rational agreement have extensively been analysed by political philosophy, with the 
                                                     
 
17 In 1990 the American company Bechtel Corporation privatized water services in Cochabamba, the 
third-largest city in Bolivia. W ater prices tripled, it became necessary to buy a license to access water 
resources and a licensing system for collecting rainwater was also introduced. After a year, 55 percent 
of local citizens had not yet obtained the access to water. In April 2000, hundreds of thousands 
marched on the streets of Cochabamba to protest against the Government, and forced it to revoke the W 
ater Privatisation Law. The contract with the multinational company Bechtel was terminated and the 
water service concession re- advertised. The conflict, known as the “Cochabamba W ater W ar’’, be-
came symbolic of the struggles fought to protect common rights, proving that popular participation 
could have a major influence on decision making in regard to the management of public services. 
18 Evidences of the fact that similar concepts have started to be fully included in the analysis of the dif-
ferent scenarios of economic development are contained in the recent OECD Report (OECD/OCSE 
2011) on how to measure society's well-being, as well as in the Stiglitz et al. Commission's famous Pa-
per (2008) on the identification of alternative measures of GDP to use in order to represent contempo-
rary society's conditions. 
19 As for rational agreement in contemporary moral philosophy, see Rawls (1994), accomplishing the 
statements started in Rawls (1982). 
 Massimo Chiocca 
 
148 
aim to identify the main elements of a fair (and rational) society.20 Interestingly, in 
philosophic studies the term "agreement" (even when not accompanied by the 
modifier rational) has often acquired a meaning close to the concept of knowledge; 
agreeing on something requires a certain knowledge of the very object of the 
agreement, as stated by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole (1683), who edited the 
so-called Port Royale Logic21, or John Locke.22 
Then, we will intend rational as a modifier which identifies a process able to 
lead to an agreement (and create knowledge), only in case it is a free and justified 
process and every subjects who accept the agreement – reciprocally depending on 
one another but still keeping their own freedom – prove able to fulfil their own 
goals. The above described situation would result from a moral condition of mutual 
respect, based on the impartial acknowledgement of each ones' rights and interests.23 
The second point introduces the possibility to identify a demarcation 
principle24, helpful in distinguishing a moral innovation (the one we are interested 
in) from a morally-neutral or immoral one. This principle reveals extremely 
interesting because of its ontological implications: in order to correctly trace the 
demarcation line, necessary to distinguish responsible innovations from 
irresponsible ones, it is important to refer, not to a meaning criterion, but to a 
"knowledge criterion" which proves helpful in identifying responsible innovations 
among the wide range of the existing ones.25 
                                                     
 
20 Again we have to underline that any rational preference is not a priori a moral preference too: it has 
to meet additional criteria, such as universality and impersonality, meaning that it has to be, at the same 
time, unanimously acknowledged and independent from the different conceptions of good (Veca 1986). 
21 «After things have resulted from our ideas, we compare these very ideas and, finding out that some 
agree and other ones, instead, disagree with each other, we connect and disconnect them, that is con-
firming or denying, in other terms, judging them» (Log II, 3). 
22 Locke (2004 [1690], IV, 1 § 2) defines knowledge as «the perception of the connection of and 
agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas». 
23 This perspective is based on the concept of "social contract" developed by Rousseau (2008 [1762]) 
and further updated from a theoretical point of view by John Rawls. 
24 As for the demarcation principle in science philosophy, see Popper (2009) and Laudan (1979). 
25 Popper (1972) introduces this concept with the aim to establish a demarcation principle distinguish-
ing scientific theories from non-scientific ones. He uses the term "demarcation principle" to define a 
principle helpful in distinguishing «empirical sciences' assertions from all the other assertions, religious 
as well as metaphysical, in other terms, pseudoscientific ones» (ivi, pp. 70-71). Popper proposes the 
application of the falsification principle in science: «Please, pay attention to the fact that I propose fal-
sification as a demarcation principle and not as principle of knowledge» (Popper 1970, p. 22, note 3); 
then added that: «falsification separates two kinds of actually relevant assertions: the ones which can be 
falsified and those which cannot. It traces a line within the language and not around it» (ibid.). The lat-
ter meaning of the demarcation principle is the one we actually are interested in, as able to establish a 
border, even if a fuzzy one, however clearly identifiable and able to distinguish responsible innovations 
from all the other possible forms of innovation (Popper 1970). We will neither consider here some 
problems of strictly logical nature caused by falsificationism, nor the debate on such a principle's effec-
tiveness, also from a knowledge perspective, originated by some authors. 
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Therefore, both the need to derive from a rational agreement and the 
identification of a demarcation principle result into a "deontological" approach to 
innovation, in the name of the binding and unchanging principles applied. 
The deontological ethics of Modern Age derived from Immanuel Kant's work 
define an action or a behaviour as necessary simply because "good in itself".26 The 
analytic philosophy of the XX century describes them as ethics which measure 
morality not referring to results but to a specific principle. 
The third and the fourth points of the definition contained in the UGO Stan-
dard, instead, refer to teleological characteristics: the acquisition of a dynamic 
dimension continually evolving, able to establish a long-lasting relationship among 
the interested parties to the innovative process. 
The second part of the definition refers to a concept which played an 
important role during the definition of the UGO Standard's structure. We are 
referring to interested parties participation into the processes intended to establish 
the guidelines to be followed in the scientific and industrial research.  
However, further clarifications, regarding that part of the definition referring 
to the acquisition of a dynamic dimension are here required. Because of the nature 
of innovation, a phenomenon trying to cast light on still undiscovered knowledge 
areas (even if not totally imaginable)27, exclusively imposing the adoption of an 
ethics which only refers to deontological principles, from a moral perspective could 
have proved, at least, to be a questionable choice. 
As opposed to deontologically ethical theories, the teleological ones tend to 
«make the right, the obligatory, and the morally good dependent on the non-morally 
good» (Frankena 1996, p. 64), in other words, to judge moral consequences referring 
to non-moral consequences, such as happiness, pleasure and usefulness.28 
                                                     
 
26 In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant (1970 [1785]) defines the concept of categor-
ical imperative (= moral imperative) as the obligation to realize an action that, being good in itself, re-
veals as objectively necessary. The categorical imperative differs from any other obligations for three 
main features: it cannot be influenced (it does not help to reach a goal); it applies to every men in every 
situations (as it does not depend from any specific action or behaviour); it expresses a pure will (not 
conditioned or conditionable by contingent events), that is the will to accomplish an action requiring no 
explanation. 
27 Johnson (2011) introduces the concept of "adjacent possible" as the only source of innovation which 
could be, at the same time, conceived and transformed in applications which can be used by society. In 
order to explain the concept, the Author provides the example of a series of doors and rooms: opening 
the first door, we enter a room in which there are other several doors leading to other rooms. The adja-
cent possible is what we find in the first room and that we can, immediately, turn into innovative appli-
cations useful to society. Even though people, in some cases, can open several doors one after another, 
in consequence of which knowledge will make remarkable progresses, unfortunately in these situations 
it will be difficult to be able to transform the acquire knowledges into innovative applications, as often 
there lack the necessary technological or social conditions (or both). 
28 As for the differences existing between deontological and teleological ethics, see Abbagnano–
Fornero (2005) who provide a definition of the two terms. Another possible distinction between the two 
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Thus, these two principles make the first two dependent on contingency: the 
application of the former could not theoretically exclude the possibility that an 
innovation, even if developed in compliance with the above mentioned 
deontological principles, could anyway determine undesired effects29, even though 
the first two principles, at least in theory, could be totally independent from 
contingency. Paying attention to people's different opinions during every phases of 
the innovation process, as well as knowing and being willing to understand their 
relevance, results into a reciprocal relation connecting innovation-makers and 
innovation-users or those people undergoing its effects, that is an ethically-relevant 
relationship. It is clear that only a dynamic approach, based on the 
acknowledgement and adoption of some principles, continuously paying attention to 
and analysing organizations' activity, could lead to such a result. 
This is the reason why the four points listed in the definition of quality of life, 
presented by the UGO Standard, continually move to and from the deontological 
and the teleological dimension, trying to offer a possible and reliable moral guide to 
the innovative process taking place in contemporary society. 
The aim of this strategy, in fact, consists in giving birth to a kind of method, 
or "moral language" in Richard M. Hare's words, which can also be followed as for 
the development of the UGO Standard30 itself. 
3. Governance of innovation 
The adoption of the above mentioned "moral language" represents the prerequisite to 
the construction of a governance system able to create and manage innovation 
dynamics within organizations, according to the principle stating that innovation has 
to be guided towards the improvement of people's quality of life. In practical terms, 
this implies the possibility to establish management strategies intended to guarantee 
that, when analysing innovation's impacts, attention will be paid, not only to 
                                                                                                         
 
approaches to ethical theories is presented by Rawls: he defines the first category as the one including 
those ethics which put the right before the good, while the second one as that including those ethics 
which put the good before the right. 
29 Nevertheless, it appears to be pragmatically impossible to support the existence of a clear distinction, 
between the above described groups of ethical theories, actually identifiable in human behaviours. 
Therefore, contemporary moral philosophy tries to preserve the principles (deontological approach) 
and, at the same time, to pay attention to the results derived from their application (teleological ap-
proach).The methodology followed to define the basic principles characterizing the concept of quality' 
of life and, then, the UGO Standard conform to that underlying belief. 
30 In Hare's opinion (2006) moral thought's objectiveness does not consists in the transformation of 
moral questions in practical ones, as this would lead to a relativism binding us to specific cultures and 
languages. On the contrary, it derives from the generally normative nature of that moral language 
which could be adopted by different cultures and ages. 
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economic criteria, but also to other elements which may be labelled as social and 
environmental ones.31 
Analysing the question from a mere logical-pragmatic point of view, the first 
thing to do consists in deciding in which phase of the innovation process would it be 
more appropriate to exercise this form of control. For the first time in 1980 an Eng-
lish researcher, David Collingridge, asked himself whether it had actually been 
possible to exercise a form of "social control"32 on the consequences of innovation, 
especially on those innovations which effects on society could play a leading role in 
the evaluation of their actual success (or insuccess), with regard to the established 
goals, giving birth to the phenomenon known as "Collingridge’s dilemma". This 
theory could briefly be explained as such: «attempting to control a technology is 
difficult, and not rarely impossible, because during its early stages, when it can be 
controlled, not enough can be known about its harmful social consequences to 
warrant controlling its development; but by the time these consequences are 
apparent, control has become costly and slow» (Collingridge 1983, p. 40). The 
scientific literature agrees with Collingridge as for the huge difficulties met in trying 
to effectively operate during the innovation process's first stage; in fact, during that 
phase, which can be defined as "creative", researchers and decision-makers have 
very few instruments (with limited effectiveness and efficacy) at their disposal to 
use, in order to identify the possible negative effects that innovation, in its early 
stages, could determine. In this regard, one of the most important available 
methodological operators, also adopted by the UGO Standard, undoubtedly is the 
Precautionary Principle.33 
Here we will try only to in-depth examine one of its most critical elements: 
we will try to identify the conditions which could lead to its application to decision-
making processes. The complete (or sometimes partial) lack of knowledge in 
decision-making processes could, at least in theory, assume four different 
connotations as shown below: 
                                                     
 
31 While planning and making innovations, paying attention to such variables represents an important 
step to take in order for any organization to adopt a responsible approach to innovation. 
32 We can define social control as a process including all those activities intended to conform people's 
behaviour with the aim to make them complying with collective regulations and satisfying collective 
expectations. Here, the reference group is represented by society and, then, the expectations to be con-
sidered are those deriving from it. Referring to what already stated in the first part of this contribution, 
the hypothesis, here considered as preliminary, states that life quality improvement could be included 
in the group of social expectations, and adds that society itself, according to the definition of social 
control above reported, could try to influence and guide organizations' behaviour towards the creation 
of innovations which could contribute to this goal. 
33 For more details on the origin and the evolution of the precautionary principle, see Comitato na-
zionale per la bioetica (The National Bioethics Advisory Commission 2004), Sisiti–Olivato (2010), 
Wynne (1992), Hunyadi (2004). 
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1. decisions under conditions of risk; 
2. decisions under conditions of uncertainty; 
3. decisions under conditions of ignorance; 
4. decisions under conditions of indeterminacy.34 
 
As for decisions to take under conditions of risk we refer, for example, to a 
contingency in which we know both the impacts and the probability for such 
impacts to occur; then the decision to take, on the basis of essentially known 
information, regards the level of risk that one is willing to take on. Obviously the 
acceptability of these risks will be conditioned, apart from by social variables, also 
by economic considerations based on a cost/benefit analysis. 
In case of decisions to take under conditions of uncertainty, we know its 
possible effect, although we ignore both the probability for the phenomenon to occur 
and the forms it could take. 
In case of decisions to take under conditions of ignorance, instead, we neither 
know the possible negative events nor whether and how the latter could eventually 
occur. 
Finally, in case of decisions to take under conditions of indeterminacy, apart 
from ignoring all the aspects listed in the previous lines, we neither know the socio-
cultural context which will be affected by the effect caused by decisions, nor we 
know the future expectations on the variables to consider; in other words, we are not 
able to evaluate the acceptability of any impact. If this analysis is right, the 
Precautionary Principle comes into play in cases of uncertainty and ignorance (2 and 
3); on the contrary, it could prove not much effective when making decisions under 
conditions of kind 1, while it reveals completely ineffective, as any other method or 
predictive instrument, under conditions of kind 4. 
The UGO Standard defines the Precautionary Principle as «a standard of 
conduct intended to identify the point of compatibility between technical- scientific 
development, necessary to humanity, and the management of the revealed or 
assumed menaces brought along by such development». This definition, which also 
tries to analyse the principle from a cognitive perspective, presents as the first 
element able to guide research approaches, especially those adopted in the initial 
phase of the innovation process. However, being it an instrument applied in 
conditions of uncertainty or ignorance, its chance to responsibly guide the 
innovation process present well defined limits. At its best, once identified possible 
areas of uncertainty or ignorance, the application of the Precautionary Principle 
could contribute to determine possible conducts to assume, in case a possible 
situation realizes. Moreover, as the only application of this principle is not able to 
make the above described situation real, it is necessary to implement complementary 
                                                     
 
34 For more details on the meaning of this taxonomy see Wynne (1992), who first suggested it. 
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measures, intended to speed up research and to decrease the degree of uncertainty 
which prevents responsible innovation to realize. In fact, if on the one hand the 
innovation process usually reveals unquestionable, with regard to economic reasons, 
on the other one, it is not as such when taking into account ethical reason and final 
users' opinions. Therefore, it is necessary to find a dynamic balance between these 
opposed positions, as underlined by the Precautionary Principle too. 
At this point, it still remain unsolved the problem consisting in the 
implementation of a system able to manage the second phase of the innovation 
process, when the innovative applications created spread in society, causing non-
considered or non-conceivable impacts. 
This lead to two necessary actions to take: managing those externalities 
determined by the innovation process and promptly and effectively contributing to 
the decisions intended to spread the produced innovations on the market. 
As for the first action, we are focusing on the problem represented by the 
acceptability of science and of its products by society, which assures that 
innovation's possible impacts have been appropriately and correctly evaluated. In 
this situation, extremely important reveals the concept of "independent research"35, 
which identifies a research method that each organization would have to adopt in 
every phases of the innovation process: it would give the possibility to access in 
many different ways knowledges and different opinions, unconditioned or 
conditioned by the success (on the market or in society) of the created innovations. 
As for the second action, instead, we have to consider two more aspects. The 
first one consists in the collection of data thanks to which it would be possible to 
classify those elements, playing an important role in externalities management; then, 
the second one, consists in the possibility for these elements to effectively influence 
the decision-making processes which lead to the development and/or possible 
correction of the applications deriving from the created innovations. 
The UGO Standard identifies the construction of a structured and long- lasting 
relation with stakeholders as the necessary starting point for the creation of an 
effective control system able to manage externalities. Simone Arnaldi's contribution 
(compare supra) has highlighted that, when there is no relationship, then no 
dialogue, with stakeholders, innovations risk to be rejected by society: he suggests 
                                                     
 
35 The UGO Standard explicitly mentions the concept of "independent research" in case it is necessary 
to apply the precautionary principle in one of the field undergoing innovation (requirement 4.1 D). 
More in general, this concept could refer to every phases of the innovation process, as the possible ben-
efits deriving from it, also in economic terms, acquire extreme importance for some reasons: 1. the re-
duction, from the very beginning, of the possible risks determined by ignoring some relevant points of 
views, opposing the main perspective adopted by the organization during the innovation process; 2 
though economically challenging in the short-term, taking into account the possible negative conse-
quences and the externalities that could take place, at the expenses of organisations, in case this ap-
proach is not adopted, it will reveal extremely advantageous in a long-term perspective. 
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that the absence of any form of communication between innovation-makers and 
innovation-users would «give the impression that there is something wrong in 
technology itself». In this regard, extremely important reveals the role played by 
organizations in the spread of information among stakeholders, regarding the very 
innovations being developed or spread; in fact, this could «rise their awareness of 
the actual of possible consequences which could be determined by the introduced 
innovations».36 Therefore, apart from containing the above mentioned possible 
negative effects, organizations could increase their chances to receive from parties 
feedbacks on the actual or perceived impacts – originated by the application of the 
introduced innovation –, based on an objective background and not only deriving 
from a priori or ideological stances.37 
Moreover, it is important to give start to this process from the very early 
stages, in order to guarantee the promptly application of corrective actions, which, in 
turn, would avoid to pay exorbitant amount of money for their implementation, as it 
happens in case innovative applications start spreading before a similar relation and 
control system has started to work.38 Though these actions are necessary to produce 
responsible innovations, they cannot guarantee it on their own; in fact, in order for 
corporate government model to effectively contribute to the above mentioned goal, 
strategical and operative decisions have to "actually" be influenced by the 
information given to stakeholders and the relationships established with them; 
moreover, these decisions have to be "perceived" by society as deriving from the 
very relations established among stakeholders and organizations. 
In fact, there exists a huge difference between the exclusively informative 
involvement of stakeholders and their active participation to innovative processes. 
For informative involvement we refer to all those unidirectional activities (from 
                                                     
 
36 UGO Certification Standard, version 1.1 2012, requirement 5.8. 
37 The possibility to have a grounded critical judgement directly depends on the knowledge of the very 
object to be evaluated. In other words, in order to judge something, it is necessary to, at least, partially 
know it. This explains the need to spread the information regarding a specific phenomenon recurring to 
the widest range of possible methods and forms. Obviously, there are different kinds of information 
regarding the produced innovations and it is important to exactly know the difference existing between 
the ones to spread and those, instead, not to disclose, as referring to specific technical features identi-
fied in corporate environments as trade secrets. Nevertheless, there have to exist other solutions in the 
in-between space separating the two poles (total information and zero information), able to help stake-
holders to form their own opinions. In his latest work James S. Fishkin (2009), who has been studying 
the dynamics through which citizens express grounded judgements on public policies, proves that 
groups of citizens, chosen on a statistical base, are perfectly able, recurring to the deliberative polling, 
to not only understand the topics involved, but also to analyse the scenarios and then take grounded 
decisions even in those cases requiring an in-depth and topic-specific knowledge. 
38 Though it reveals actually difficult to implement effective control systems during the creative phase 
of the innovation-making process, it is possible, at least in theory, to adopt a managing system since the 
very beginning of the so-called applicative phase, able to guarantee the production of actually responsi-
ble innovations. 
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innovation-makers to possible innovation-users or people undergoing the effects of 
their applications), consisting in presentations, publications (of sustainability 
reports, for example), the opening of debates, on-line forums etc., mainly occurring 
when «the decisions as for the adoption of a specific innovation have already been 
taken» (Pellegrini 2010, p. 306). On the contrary, we define participation as the 
possibility for people involved in innovative dynamics to directly contribute to the 
debate which is developing on a specific technical-scientific question [...]; in other 
words, the term participation implies the entrance in the debate of different points of 
view, others than technical ones, such as ethical, social and economic ones, which 
could be taken into consideration during the decision-making process regarding 
technological-scientific innovations (ibid.). 
In this regard, the UGO Standard asks organizations to identify the most 
important areas in the activities undergoing innovation and to adopt methods 
allowing to constantly verify whether the goals they autonomously established meet 
stakeholders' expectations in these very sectors.39 
The UGO Standard governance system also includes some specific perfor-
mance requirements to be satisfied by certified organizations during the 
implementation of a control system regarding the application and spread of 
responsible innovations. They require to invest every year, at least, 5% of the added 
value produced by the organization in research activities and, in case the 
Precautionary Principle is applied, to invest, at least, 1%40 of the turnover obtained 
thanks to the production of products or services, which have required the application 
of this Principle to the independent research, aimed at reducing the uncertainty and 
ignorance characterising some of the above mentioned decision-making processes 
connected to innovation.41 
The foregoing requirements, together with a set of indicators (describing the 
specific domains interested by innovation and its applications), a government model 
(able to interpret and keep under control these indicators42), an effective 
methodology (allowing to spread relevant information and to listen to stakeholders' 
opinions and consider them in decision-making processes43) give birth to a complete 
                                                     
 
39 UGO Certification Standard, version 1.1 2012, requirement 5.4 and 5.5. 
40 Ivi, requirement 4.1. 
41 As already affirmed, the UGO Standard asks organizations to prove their attempt to take relevant 
actions aimed at collecting information, which will prove useful when making decisions regarding in-
novative policies. Thus, investing in activities giving helpful indications in the decision-making pro-
cess, especially in those case when the Precautionary Principle have been applied, or in research or de-
velopment activities, is an important step to take. Obviously, the amount to invest in both cases have 
been calculated taking into considerations some sector-specific benchmarks and on the basis of non-
rigorous mathematical calculations, but rather recurring to "good sense". 
42 UGO Certification Standard, version 1.1 2012, requirement 5.3, 5.4 and 5.7. 
43 Ivi, requirement 5.8. 
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system able to guarantee an effective and responsible governance of innovation , 
thanks to a continuously operating action-feedback mechanisms. 
This can happen thanks to the possibility, given by such a system, to promptly 
and effectively correct or eliminate undesired externalities which could accidentally 
originate. 
As for its general structure, the UGO Standard presents a static component, 
including structural requirements which impose some limits which corporate 
innovative activities have to respect, and a dynamic one, including the relationships 
established with stakeholders and the ability of these relationships to significantly 
influence organizations' innovative choices. The uniqueness of the approach 
introduced by the UGO Standard consists in the fact that the dynamic component 
plays a significant role also in determining the static component, or better, in 
identifying some of the established requirements. The static component, instead, 
represents the reference framework able to assure a dynamic and creative innovation 
process, putting some limits to its development, in order for it to responsibly 
contribute to the established goal (to improve the "quality of life") and requires to 
pay attention to stakeholders' opinions (the actual dynamic activity).44 
Extremely helpful in understanding this concept reveals the asbestos cement 
industrial production history. The construction industry has been extensively using 
asbestos cement, this mixture of asbestos and cement characterized by high 
insulating capacities, since the beginning of last century. In medical literature, for 
the first time in 1906 the asbestos dust was linked to lung cancer and in 1930 in the 
United Kingdom medical research fist proved that the exposure to asbestos could 
increase the risk of mesothelioma, findings which led to the introduction of a 
compensation laws for workers suffering from asbestos-related diseases. Although 
the Italian law, together with many other countries all over the word, eventually 
introduced a prohibition regulation banning the use of asbestos in any form, because 
of its dangerousness, only in 1992! If the UGO Standard had been adopted by the 
enterprise which produced asbestos cement on a large scale, first of all it would have 
had to invest in independent research aimed at better analysing the connection 
existing between the production and use of asbestos cement and asbestos-related 
diseases (as some suppositions had already been made), and then it would have 
imposed a requirement (Static Component), demanding to pay attention to 
stakeholders' opinions, in order to obtain some information on the impacts 
determined by the innovation produced. The collection of feedbacks (Dynamic 
Component) would have probably make the enterprise reconsidering its industrial 
strategy and, on the basis of the above described continuous interaction with parties, 
                                                     
 
44 As for the relevant role played by constraint in creative processes compare supra, note 15. It refers to 
the fact that the UGO Standard does not show organizations how to describe the innovation process, 
but asks them to highlight the domains and to provide the indicators able to better describe this process; 
nevertheless, also these actions require to responsibly act. 
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the corrections made would have led to a new constraint, put on production and 
controlled by stakeholders. 
Unfortunately, during the large-scale production of asbestos cement in Italy 
(from 1907 to 1986) very few information had been spread, allowing the enterprise 
to long keep in secrecy the risk of mesothelioma deriving from the inhalation of 
asbestos dusts. A similar behaviour would not have been possible today, thanks to 
the extensive use of different technologies able to widely spread information, as well 
as to people's solid and well-established opinions. 
This situation has made the adoption of an approach, similar to the one 
introduced by the UGO Standard, ever more compelling, also from a strictly (and we 
could add cynically, with regard to the previous presented example) economic point 
of view. In fact, because of legislative evolution, in curt the principle of restoration 
of starting conditions is ever more often applied in those cases when the ecosystem 
in which the enterprise operates has been endangered (as it happened in the above 
described case); moreover, ever more importance has started to be given to the 
compensations for damages to be paid to those people who have suffered the effects 
caused by possible negative externalities, resulting from organizations' activities; 
unfortunately, this could never compensate neither for the victims of asbestos-
related diseases nor for the problems caused to their relatives. 
Therefore, we can consider this approach able to contribute to solve the 
"Collingridge’s dilemma", thanks to the possibility to control the effect determined 
by innovation on society. The English researcher defined the phase during which 
innovative applications spread as the one in which it would be possible to more 
effectively apply an audit system, able to manage the possible externalities produced 
by this very process.45 The UGO Standard, though paying attention to the creative 
and theoretical development46, focuses on innovative application government 
strategies, asking organizations to establish, control and reconsider their goals on the 
basis of the feedbacks collected among stakeholders, in order to contribute to the 
creation of responsible innovations (responsible with regard to the extensively 
analysed goal). This represents a desirable and verifiable situation for society. This, 
in fact, also explains why CISE decided to create the UGO Standard as a voluntary 
Certification, issued by independent third parties, according to the management 
standard systems, usually adopted by organizations. The UGO Standard approach, in 
fact, is characterized by «the choice to ascribe its action to the sphere of behaviors 
adopted, on a voluntary basis, by companies and belonging to the so called “soft law 
                                                     
 
45 In order to solve those problems which make it difficult to control the applications originated by the 
innovation process, the decision-making process originating them has to acquire «flexibility, controlla-
bility, corrigibility or insensitivity to error» (Collingridge 1983, p. 40). 
46 See the above reported discussion on the application of the Precautionary Principle. 
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regulation”», and by «the adoption of the principles and categories of management 
systems implemented by organizations».47 
Finally, we could argue that the UGO Certification summarizes apparently 
opposed concepts. Some examples of the latter are represented by the already 
mentioned dyad static-dynamic, which describes the standard general structure, or 
the formal opposition existing between the deontological and teleological approach, 
presented at the beginning of this contribution when taking about general ethical 
theories. Another interesting conceptual dyad contains the terms innovation and 
responsibility, as the latter (in the name of a goal to achieve) tries to limit the 
former, though impossible to be limited by its nature. 
Therefore, it emerges that, together with a declared goal, the improvement of 
the "quality of life", the UGO Standard also tries to achieve a second aim: the search 
of balance. The importance of the latter though, could not be understood at a first 
sight, as it would not lead to measurable results: it consists in the attempt to create a 
new approach to knowledge, able to take into consideration the complexity of that 
knowledge which originates innovations, including notions, not only deriving from 
the technological- scientific or economic domain, but also from the moral and social 
ones.48 
In conclusion, the UGO Standard is based on a difficult challenge and an 
ambitious programme. Nevertheless, we believe that the funding idea which 
originated this project presents evidences proving its appropriateness and relevance, 
as well as its strategic and economic importance in the long term.49 
                                                     
 
47 UGO Certification Standard, version 1.1 2012, Foreword. This choice has been based on mere prac-
tical reasons, as these instruments, because of their specific features and application, could be better 
understood and adopted by organisations. 
48 Morin (2012) claims that the complex concept at the basis of contemporary society always consists 
in the union of two opposed concepts. In his last work the French philosopher- sociologist affirms that 
the bigger are the situations, the more relevant are the reactions to them. Notwithstanding the fact that 
pessimism is what clearly emerges from contemporary contingent situation, the relevance of the reac-
tions to this tough moment generates optimism. 
49 Apart from that contained in the already mentioned strategical documents produced by the OECD 
and those by the French Presidency, we can also report here the definition of responsible innovation 
given by the European Commission: «a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and 
innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view on the (ethical) acceptability, sus-
tainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products» (European 
Commission 2011, p. 9); then, that of social innovation given by the Bureau of European Policy Advis-
ers (BEPA 2011, p. 33): «we define social innovations as new ideas (products, services and models) 
that simultaneously meet social needs (more effectively than alternatives) and create new social rela-
tionships or collaborations. They are innovations that are not only good for society but also enhance its 
capacity to act». However, more relevant have proved the innumerable sectoral or transversal initia-
tives, conferences and publications organized on the topic during last years, mainly at an international 
level, proving the contemporaneity and urgency of the topic itself. 
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